A close-up view of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's dark pinstripe suit. Photo: REUTERS/Jim Bourg/File
A government that robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of Paul — GB Shaw, an Irish playwright and critic
The lately arisen months of India’s diplomacy setbacks unveil the inherent limitations on foreign policy commitment. The present conjuncture after recent Indo-Pak clashes, the doctrine, which New Delhi's kept as armour, has flipped dramatically. An unprecedented assailing from the hankering of Washington is numbing New Delhi approaches to put the pedal to the metal on its temptation of the ‘rising power’ ambition. The weaponization of the world economy by the maverick Trump administration has carefully sophisticated Indo-US relationship has abruptly gone off the rails, and India’s burgeoning animosity with Pakistan, the Russia-Ukrain war, as well as China’s reshaping the global politics is, are certainly not bringing steadiness to the fragile fabric of international order.
Washington’s approach in the everlasting trade dispute with New Delhi signals a shift in policy priorities, which today is based on cold realism and on what the other country has to offer—one with significant long-term implications. Trump is transactional; his benefit is, first priority. At this point, a fundamental question becomes apparent and needs to be addressed, why many other states have escaped with lower tariff rates than India’s ? First of all, India had little to offer by way of trade or strategic endorsement and America has much more to benefit from China than it does from India — Trump seems far more keen to strike an arrangement with China than to relent on his tough stance toward India. Whilst Pakistan had more to offer—location-wise, mineral-wise and also a willingness to be a junior ally. Pakistan and Bangladesh set sail into the tariff negotiations and frighteningly more conscious of their economic vulnerabilities and the broader strategic stakes, besides India. In spite of the fact that Pakistan and Bangladesh were more circumspect, each nursing concerns about the future of their bilateral relations with the United States.
It is crucial to face facts, If India wasn't buying oil from Russia, it would still get the tariff slap. Though coercing India to buy F-35 jets or expensive crude oil, doesn't align with New Delhi's defense as well as energy requirements, however, a blackmail. Similarly, the concerns of GM seed imports would undermine India's standing, reckoning it as a weak sovereign on the global stage. Secondary tariffs on India over its purchase of Russian oil give Washington leverage in foreign policy, especially in relation to Russia and the war in Ukraine. The consolidated perspective of the Trump analysis is that China cannot be blackmailed, but India can. While Trump has immersed on tariffs [125% on China] as his trade weapon of choice, China's strategy goes well beyond imposing its own levies, relying on the lure of the Chinese market for US companies. China is not going to bend before the tariff storm anytime but the tactics that Beijing has heretofore applied and is conceivably to dilate, intimidate and penalized US companies. Although the Russian and Ukrainian problem is a European problem, not those of the United States; even Trump wants to carry out his MAGA and private aspirations. Trump tariff hikes on India in retaliate to importing Russian oil, won’t merely trim Indian margins; they'll cost labour-intensive jobs—MSME (40-45%), textile (70 million livelihoods), gems plus jewellery (1 lakh livelihoods), leather, auto parts, handicrafts, pharma (40%), and engineering goods (1.9 mn). Morgan Stanley move to cast in caution: Trump's tariff's direct impact on growth is likely to be 60bps while the indirect impact could be of a similar magnitude, over a period of 12 months. The factor behind the unprecedented behaviour of the White House under Trump is, indeed, that India’s inability to match China in the future, as well as its commitment to multipolarity, which is fundamentally at odds with American interests, will be deeply inconvenient for the United States. India's, it strikes one that, will partner with the United States on a range of things involving China, albeit it is not likely to partner with Washington in every crucial arena—even when it comes to Beijing. Washington thought India to behave identically in certain lines of the Indo-Pacific, albeit not in the desire to sustain Elephant security to made Dragon achilles’ heel. On account of that, innúmerable US officials mumble, "if India wants to be treated as a strategic partner of the US, it desideratum to start acting like one."
It is categorically clear that there is something deficient within the body of the Indian external ministry, as a consequence of inadequate resources, as a few tangled criticisms bring animadversion to the fore—New Delhi goes down in flames/unaccomplished in understanding of its allies perspective and priorities, which clearly stand out. Apart from these systemic vulnerabilities, another drawback curtailment New Delhi's restricted strength to model [and leverage] its partners intentions, preferences, and behaviour. These diplomatic setbacks also unveil that, unlike the American-Jews, American-Indian [or Indian Diaspora] expatriates have failed to assert a meaningful presence and leverage — including influence on the international stage. Indian policymakers thought that the India could maintain its ties, for instance, with the Iran and Russia while still working intimately with Israel and the United States, or building coalitions in so-called QUAD, and simultaneously demonstrate mounting ambition to diversify South-South Cooperation via BRICS. However, through the approach of multi-alignment, India's economic, strategic, and military needs could be gratified by any partner or coalition. It is India’s virtue that it can have good ties with every state in the world, but this speculate entitlement India has in the world system also illuminates its weaknesses; India’s position actually does not matter enough for countries to really get upset. Balancing China, US and Russia is comprehensively paradoxical for the New Delhi, while yet India's strategy lies in the competing pressure. Indeed, without limited resources New Delhi can't manage its ambition. There is no doubt that India defines itself by strategic autonomy and will not be anyone's ‘junior ally’, as the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, pledged that India would never become a ‘camp follower’ of any super power, that principle would never be crippled by anyone, including his principal faultfinder and influential critic [PM Modi] being in power. Yet India had lost its standing in the Global South along with its prestige, crumbles under pressure like a house of cards and not standing up to international bullies.
Continent Asia is also home to China: another nuclear-armed country with a huge population, a developed army, and an enormous economy—which now accounts for 17 per cent of the global economy—alongwith a literate, skilled, and comparatively healthy population; greater technological proficiency; and larger capital stocks, including substantial investments in critical technologies, such as artificial intelligence, robotics, energy storage, and information and communications, which could diversify growth despite its demographic constraints. China has become a close-peer competitor to the United States, and the two countries' competition is playing out in virtually every domain. Beijing has been forthright in orating on behalf of the Global South, expressing solidarity with developing economies against the convulsion of global trade, and inviting India to get on board, conveying the concerns of developing economies. China's influence is robustly diminishing Indian interest. Hence, whilst the government clings to a domestic portrayal of strength against China at the border, the practical realities are inconveniently stark — after a [Galwan] standoff, New Delhi strives to terminate Chinese investment [or restrict import], which goes down the drain. Amidst the tension with Washington, a thaw in India-China relations calibrates with a new esperance of potentials. For all that, trade with China remained highly imbalanced, with imports worth $133.5 billion— almost ten times the actual export value —and exports just $14.3 billion, resulting in a record bilateral deficit of $99.2 billion in 2024-25. They solely italicise India’s cramped leverage and relative incapacity. In a sense, this and the forthcoming challenge will walk into the lion's den and be far worse than 1962 or 2020. Thus, India can't undermine Chinese influence despite the of that China supported — supplied over 81 per cent of military hardware and intelligence to — Islamabad during recent may clashes, while Indians struck in a cacophony of clamouring boycott against Turkey.
India's ‘Make in India’ programme, furthermore, that assure to revolutionise India into a global manufacturing hub is still so contingent on Chinese-made goods and investment, India remains substantially reliant on Chinese components, critical rare earth [for Indian vehicle manufacturers], raw materials, tunnel-boring machines [for bullet train project], fertilizer [such as DAP], key energy talent and technology therefore India couldn't change China in the supply chain — the dependency has shifted from finished goods to upstream goods, for which New Delhi is striving for separate sorts of negotiation from some year's. New Delhi vulnerabilities are becoming ‘multi-dependent’ on China for upstream goods, on the US for advanced technology, and on Russia for energy and defence supplies. Large Indian conglomerates spend far less on R&D than global peers, leading to fewer patents and slower technology adoption— till this date, India's complicity has been targeted due to a lack of R&D initiatives, it's not fugged up at all.. In critical areas like EV batteries, semiconductors, and robotics, India is left in the dust of a race where China is far ahead and grasps key patents and dominates global supply chains. Thereafter, increased Chinese investment in India could create jobs and boost manufacturing capacity, notwithstanding such dependency undermining India’s strategic autonomy.
Trump's second term continuity is marked by high-level concern and his berserk performance is blooming China in leaps and bounds. India’s heightened rivalry with China is reshaping the politics of the Global South, but competition between them is not at all to bear a sole hegemon, yet this may rein in India’s ability to emerge as the representative of the Global South, and it creates golden opportunities for Beijing to exert substantial influence. Therefore, Global South countries have adopted a strategy of pragmatism to engage with India and China in ways that serve their national interests rather than choosing sides, these states often pursue diversified partnerships, leveraging the India–China rivalry to secure better terms, broader chances and increased agency in their development trajectories. Notwithstanding, withdrawal of the United States [under Trump] from the World Health Organisation (WHO) & The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is likely to embolden China to foster its influence on the realm of education, health, science, technology, and heritage in global politics. There is no replacement of USA, except China. Under every arduous circumstances, UNESCO—as the guardian of soft power— and WHO—as the guardian of soft power —as the guardian of global public health—play a pivotal role to promote peace through textbooks [or] interactions and coordinating international health efforts. China now has greater leverage over the international organization, affirmly Beijing is naturally interested in tightening its grip on UNESCO and WHO. And China’s gain is India’s loss! The upcoming sudden explosion will keep India’s power at bay, however, it isn't coming from the West albeit from China. The Washington under Trump has nudged India into such an unprecedented or complex deadlock—undermining India's agility— lay a clear place to reinforce the emergence of G-2 and G-1, in which China already has a triumphant seat. Consequently, Trump's expedited behaviour could compel India, as New Delhi couldn't act as an antagonist nor be contingent itself on a sole ally. In world politics, fatigue has yet to outpace the seduction of animosity. Unfailingly it is Washington & Beijing who have to conclude whether to preserve peace or escalate hostility, however New Delhi pursues.
India, whose $4.1 trillion economy, rapidly expanding defence capacity, and influence among nations of the so-dubbed global South, is flanked by two nuclear adversaries—China to the north and Pakistan to the west—with hostile nostalgia. Conceivably, South Asia is generally perceived to be a most belligerent region with active armed conflict under the shadows of the nuclear weaponry in the world. The dissolution of the British Raj—on which the sun never set, was a case of failed politics of bait and switch against the mass freedom movement—in 1947 and hypocritical acts of Jinnah resulted in the rise of an official terror state—Pakistan—with India. Both rivial crispy policies engage in low-intense conflict wages by proxy war over the disputed region—Kashmir. The Pakistani military needs to conflict over Kashmir with India to justify its own critical existence—Pakistani Army would be unable to vindicate its vastness and hegemon character sans threatening India, ideologically and materially. The ‘military hegemony’ represents the military’s monopolistic control over both strategic and security issues as well as political institutions and processes. The Pakistani military’s centrality has also been shaped by repeated wars with India—in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999—predominantly over Kashmir. The sense of a perpetual threat posed by India is “one of the fundamental factors” that gave the military a prominent position in Pakistani society, politics and governance. Pakistan asserts that Kashmir is an “unfinished part of the agenda of Partition.” The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 was unaccomplished because Kashmir was the solely Muslim-majority province in British India. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah along with numerous leaders and military chiefs have promulgated a hoax narrative — emphasized the significance of Kashmir for Pakistan, describing it as the ‘jugular vein’ since Pakistan was brought into being as an official terror state. India’s national security installation must therefore approach all military crises with Pakistan with a crystal-clear comprehension of these ethnic and psychological underpinnings—it’s up against Pakistani strategic behaviour that is galvanized less by calibrated estimation, but more by identity-driven posturing and an inflated self-image.
Kashmir is, to Pakistan, a ‘lodestone’. It has been a time-tested strategy of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Pakistani handlers to rechristening and rebranding it's affiliates in order to escape scrutiny of international security agencies. New affiliates, Tehrik-e-Taliban Kashmir (TTK), enhance and deepen its outreach in Kashmir. Nomenclature will create caution in the international community. For India, the terrorist overhang in Kashmir – and with it, the relationship with Pakistan – is not a side note. Throughout a decade and beyond, terrorism had primarily been confined to the tumultuous Kashmir Valley with some isolated incidents in other parts of J&K. For all that, the arrangement of the Terrorist group has been changed with the first dawn of 2023 when terrorists executed seven people in the border district of Rajouri—the first such major attack in the Jammu division in years. Since In the previous year alone plenteous attacks have struck the Reasi, Kathua, Doda and Rajouri districts in Jammu, which indicates the geographical shift of these terror attacks sows the seeds of a strategic broadening of terrorist objectives and changed in modus operandi—counter-terror tactics— that were effective in Kashmir may not translate well to the distinct geopolitical and social landscape of Jammu. The upsurge of radical and fundamentalist Islamic elements in Bangladesh and the thaw in ties with Pakistan after the exile of Sheikh Hasina, aroused India's security threats. Pakistan is no compeer of India in terms of GDP or arsenal, yet it commands a disproportionate share of akin diplomatic bandwidth, resources into a permanent military readiness, and offers strategic leverage to China. Nathless, Pakistan's ingrained behaviour won't ameliorate and due to the Kashmir, ostensibly, further indignation and hostilities will billow over Kashmir. An India-Pakistan conflict, for instance, four day hostility, provides a strategic study for China; a blueprint. Hence, in this conflict whatever, Beijing desired about New Delhi's strategy and military accomplishments, Islamabad had brought it to fruition. In the years ahead, if China blooms even a bit faster—let's assume a mere three percent annually—it could end up with an economy that is closer to three times as large as India's—even if India uplifts at six or seven percent. China's recent trilateral experiment —with Pakistan-Afghanistan and separately with Pakistan-Bangladesh—along with China-Brazil unity shows Beijing's appetite to fade Indian ascendancy into oblivion.
This would be Inauspicious for India, Russian policy-makers perception is changing. Moscow feels a diminishing obligation to New Delhi and is more unenthusiastic to lend a hand than it receives, which explains its lukewarmness during the boiled four-day Indo-Pak clashes. Nevertheless, Russia refrained itself from condemning Islamabad and its neutrality during the latest Indo-Pak conflict, summarised as an ‘impact of Pro-BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) policy-makers [and] Trans-Eurasia Logistics, AKA CHINA RAILWAY Express’ perspective. So therefore Moscow didn’t want to irritate Beijing —a close strategic partner of Pakistan and provided it with a great deal of new weaponry—and Pro-BRI policy-makers perspective who obviously “want good relations with Islamabad”. Surprisingly, with a significant reduction in the imports of oil or defence equipment from Russia to India, Moscow may become unabashed in its support for China in its disputes with India. Indeed, Russia's perpetual full-scale invasion of Ukraine anchored its strength—disproportionate dependency—on China's will. So China will remain India’s rival and now Russia [for India] becomes as illusory as a hedging partner. The India's border with Pakistan & China is neither normal nor dispute-free, so therefore in South Asia, fatigue has yet to outpace the seductions of animosity. Whether South Asia will perpetuate to be known as a conflict-prone zone because of the key reason, Beijing and Islamabad. To offset Dragon, moreover, the extant White House and New Delhi continue to see each other as vital strategic partners in the context of a long-term rivalry with China. From the full optic of the general international community, India’s global perspective, appears kindred to Europe’s outright double-standards views.
There is a categorical acknowledgement that regional cooperation over water in South Asia will remain pivotal for Beijing in consummating its abundant goals. Entire South Asian nations have bilateral agreements over transboundary waters, and the region does not have a ‘uniform convention’ governing these shared waters, which could perceived as a balm that satiates Bejing to restrain India's ambition. There was the key factor underscore a great concern: the India's recent experience is dying in Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) as an alternative of the asphyxiated South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and has absolutely abandoned the 'Necklace of Diamond' strategy, a counter-encirclement tactic designed to counter China's 'String of Pearls' strategy, which aims to establish Chinese influence across the Indian Ocean. India neither comes off with flying colours to build internal strength, nor is able to understand its partner's perspective or priorities and ability. For instance, as much as Donald Trump —a transactional personality with fluctuating behaviour. A new obstacle has presented itself, China's latest religious diplomacy with Pakistan—a Pakistani religious delegation consisting of religious leaders & scholars held a consideration with the Islamic Sssociation of Xinjiang Autonomous region in china last July—is deeply intertwined with the neighbours strategic aim to throw down the gauntlet of India's regional influence by Intensifying BRI initiative through the SCO. China and Pakistan bluntly feed into larger tactics of countering India's regional as well global standing and amplifying anti-India brainwashing propaganda [through symbolic religious alignment], principally in the context of kashmir. To hit back these heinous tactics, nevertheless, India will need to accelerate a multi-pronged strategy at a diplomatic context; India shall strengthen ties with such Islamic states in the Gulf, Central Asia and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly with Iran and Indonesia. Ultimately, India’s actual regional adversary is not to be tracked in Islamabad but in Beijing. However, India’s success will depend on its capacity to adapt to diverse Internal and regional expectations, manage competition with China remain onerous to the heterogeneous aspirations of its Global South partners. Instead of engaging in the intense prospect dispute with anyone, New Delhi would make persistent progress in technologising—layered air defence systems, advanced drones, electronic warfare tools, and precision ISR capabilities are valuable models for co-development especially in specific theatres like high-altitude border defence — and modernising —Al-aided surveillance, samart fencing, and sensor arrays across borders—its armed capabilities under the comfort of a rigorous after-action review process are worth studying and adapting.
India require to concentrate at home, ‘ambition’ is contingent upon the internal strength of being a modernised democratic and economic emblem. For New Delhi, this is a wake-up call. Apparently it is true that India cannot always compete solely on low wages. India is obliged to hold its attention on upgrading logistics, demonstrating more ‘equal and fair participation’ in trade & commerce, reducing the cost of tech startups, eradicating income inequality, enhancing the productivity of labour force, and fortifying human capital. What’s more, it will summon the strength of India's capabilities and potential to encourage it to use its time for good purpose — and, as far more important, repeal frivolous spending (obviously, a developing nation, before allocating props to other, look inward — shrinking per capita, a jobless economy, a grave education system, a weak authority body, rampant corruption, injustice, inequality worse than the British Raj as well as a dip in the growth of loans remain areas of concern. Private or public debt burdens are on the rise and institutional funds crunch. Consumer spending — a significant contributor to the country’s GDP — remains sluggish, 'crony capitalism', inadequate capital receipt of disinvestment and delegation of public assets, including Informalization and casualisation of the workforce) plus strengthening the self-reliance belief through accumulating human capital. India's ambition of being a global economy powerhouse or superpower is contingent upon the claimants of being internal wealth emblem. This amidst crucible of adversity must be metamorphosed into the idea of seizing a chance. Though the US and China are opportunistic markets, even so New Delhi must perpetually redouble efforts to strengthen camaraderie trade relations with other crucial economies and alliances—the EU, the UK, Japan, ASEAN, and other partners in the Global South. This diversification will reduce India’s over-reliance on any one market [the US or China] and outpace resilience to counter such unprecedented one-sided irked behaviour. Thoroughly amplifying investment in skills, technology, vocational training, liberalising nuanced start-up, upgrading quality standards of export and infrastructure to encourage Indian products globally competitive is indispensable. These are all issues that India has not yet dealt with, but is sitting on. Despite this issues, a large segment of India always rollicks about the global political stage while neglecting their own [countries] predicament. There is no doubt, maybe, that in today's world, the genuine opportunity for New Delhi approche [multi-alingment] is robustly closing. Consequently, India’s sovereignty will rely on its competency to turn over a new leaf and transform into new towpath, as Manmohan Singh recited in Parliament in the prooemium of the 1991 economic reforms, “no power on earth can stop an idea,” aside Mr. Singh. “whose time has come”. India's moments of full assertion may still lie ahead..